Free Speech, Anyone?
Kevin Holtsberry has a post on some Blogville reaction to Senator Santorum's statements on homosexuality. Apparently, certain groups are trying to
"Trent Lott" Santorum for his statement. Here is the precis of the statement:
In a wide-ranging interview with The Associated Press two weeks ago, Santorum, R-Pa., said he believes homosexual acts are a threat to the American family. He drew criticism from gays and Democrats after parts of the interview - during which he compared homosexuality to bigamy, polygamy, incest and adultery - were published Monday.
''I have no problem with homosexuality - I have a problem with homosexual acts, as I would with acts of other, what I would consider to be, acts outside of traditional heterosexual relationships,'' Santorum said during an interview taped April 7 in his Senate office.
''And that includes a variety of different acts, not just homosexual,'' he said. ''I have nothing, absolutely nothing against anyone who's homosexual. If that's their orientation, then I accept that. And I have no problem with someone who has other orientations. The question is, do you act upon those orientations? So it's not the person, it's the person's actions. And you have to separate the person from their actions.''
Given a chance to clarify his comments before the story was published, Santorum said: ''I can't deny that I said it, and I can't deny that's how I feel.''
In other words, Santorum is being criticized for being a
practicing Catholic. Santorum makes the same distinction between homosexuality as an orientation or condition and homosexuality as a practice or act that the
Catholic Catechism makes. So, it appears that, once again, some groups are attempting to develop a de facto concensus that Catholics may not be elected to public office.
But, incidentally, why is Santorum wrong? What is the principle that allows us to divide homosexual acts from, say, incest? Does the argument that the constitutional right of privacy includes consensual sexual relations in the bedroom where the government should be barred not apply with equal force to consensual private activities between brother and sister (after the age of consent)? If the right of privacy means that members of the same sex should be allowed to marry because the state or society has no right to impose its value judgment on gays, why should the state or society be allowed to impose a value judgment on those who are genetically disposed to love more than one person at a time?
What precisely is the principle? Emotional disgust? But thirty years ago, homosexuality evinced the same reaction that pedophilia causes today. How can we be sure that our emotional reaction against pedophilia won't look naive thirty years from now?
Is the principle simply that the distinction between incest and homosexuality is obvious? But how common is incest? Is there really a need for laws against incest? Why do we care what brothers and sisters do after the age of consent? Do we
really think that brothers and sisters will start pairing off when they get old enough to vote. That hasn't been my observation about the relationship between siblings. [Don't even attempt to argue that the offspring of incestuous union are prone to health risks and imbecility. That view is superstitious and unscientific, particularly in the short run. In the long run, inbreeding and cross-breeding are ways of establishing "hybrid vigor." So, if you want to stake your prejudice against incest on science, realize that you are relying on a week reed.]
Finally, if you read Griswold, which held that the nebulous right to privacy included the right to purchase contraceptives, you will see that the actual constitutional right - the actual right to privacy - is the right to privacy in the
individual's decision to have children. There is a solid argument to made that the State should not have the practical ability to either breed its citizens, or to mandate that its citizens breed, or that they selectively not breed. These were real concerns at the time. The eugenic policies of the Third Reich were not that far in the past at the time of Griswold. Likewise, the Supreme Court had made its own unfortunate foray into eugenic policy in Buck v. Bell where Justice Holmes had declared that "three generations of imbeciles are enough." In that historical light, Griswold made some kind of sense.
Roe, therefore, follows in the same line by protecting the "privacy" in making decision about reproduction. I may have been the only person
not surprised by the prior sodomy decision, but I wasn't. Sodomy - homosexual practices - have nothing to do with reproduction and therefore don't fall into the Griswold line.
[By the way, I'm not making up any of this constitutional exegesis. It's all in the cases. Go read them.]
"Privacy" is an unfortunate term. "Privacy" would seem to implicate what one does in the bedroom. But that wasn't what the Supreme Court has meant by "privacy" in the past. Like I said, under prior case law, "privacy" meant "autonomy in decision-making," not "the right to do anything with your genitals that want to do so long as you do it in your own bedroom."
My prediction is that the Supreme Court has taken up the Texas case to knock-down sodomy laws. All things remaining the same - in a straight line projection of normal legal development - I think that decision will result in decision in the next twenty years constitutionalizing polygamy and striking down incest laws will follow. I suspect that there is a sufficient distinction concerning pedophilia to keep those laws intact, until someone start nicking at the age of consent, probably with scientific studies showing that children are really more mature than was previously believed. Does that sound incredible? Well, consider this, wouldn't it have seemed incredible twenty years ago that the Boy Scouts would be denied public accommodations because they refuse to allow homosexual scoutmasters? And we - members of the elite policy-making "new class" - think that development is unexceptional.
Check back in a decade and I wil say I told you so.
Update: That was faster than I thought. Here is an excerpt from
The Volokh Conspiracy which theoretically justifies the decriminalization of bestiality:
Nonetheless, this is a distinctly secondary concern. Bans on bestiality are not, I think, justified, but neither are they tremendously oppressive. Bans on a form of behavior that is vitally important to many people's most important relationships -- that is as important to them, in fact, as heterosexual behavior is important to the human relationships in which we heterosexuals engage -- are indeed tremendously oppressive. Even someone who tolerates modest burdens on liberty should reject burdens that are as grave as this.
There is nothing wrong with this line of thought as a theoretical construct. There may, in fact, be nothing wrong with the application of this theoretical construct to human action. Is there a real risk that rampant "goat-love" willl break out? Probably not. And if the focus of constitutional jurisprudence is a utilitarian analysis of the individual's self-fulfillment, then the conclusion may be mandatory.
There are, I submit, several problems here. First, recent jurisprudence to the contrary notwithstanding, just as the Constitution does not enshrine "Mr. Spencer's social statics," it doesn't enshrine Benthamite utilitarianism or Millsian utilo-romanticism (romantic utilitarianism?) Nowhere does the Constitution say that legislative branch must enact legislative programs from the standpoint of whether a particular individual's happiness is concrete or that his neighbor's discomfort is mere comstockery. Pretty much, outside of narrowly defined constitutional interests, the legislative branch has broad discretion to make such value decisions.
Second, individual preferences can result in substantial social dysfunction because individuals can be quite irrational. As much as I want to believe in the beneficence of the "individual hand" as a libertarian fellow-traveler, it is not the case that the sum of felicitious individual decisions is felicitious social utility. An interesting book on this subject is
Sick Societies: Challenging the Myth of Primitive Harmony by Robert B. Edgerton which describes how various social perceptions would result in tribes starving because they could not fish in a specific lake because of taboos. [Edgerton's book is a nice counterpoint to Marvin Harris' anthropological works that find the rationality behind various irrational taboos and, for that matter, Posner's book on law and economic which does the same thing for the common law.] Imagine, if you will, a society composed of individually satisfied bestialists. Would we believe that the maximizaiton of their separate individual utilities offset the broader social dysfunction in their society? [By which I mean, there would be happy contented man-goat relationships, but no children.]
Finally, what is the cost of
constitutionalizing the value judgment that individual sexual self-fulfillment is the sine qua non of the legal order. We may think that today, but what if we're wrong? As Justice Scalia noted, however misguided our ignorant ancestors were, at least they bequeathed the opportunity to correct their mistakes. How certain are we that our descendants will share our value judgments?
If history offers any perspective, I submit that we should be extremely skeptical that they will.