NominalismCraig wrote:
In a message dated 6/29/2009 5:19:42 P.M. Pacific Daylight Time, craigb@csufresno.edu writes:
Here's why I'm wondering. If God is defined as "being itself," which I take it is Aquinas position, and being is inherently good, then God, and the moral structure of the universe, would just be good, baring enemy action.
But if God is simply another entity in the universe among others, albeit the most powerful, then he takes up the position of being "boss" in a different way than in the Aquinas model, and so could change moral rules at will.
Seems like a fairly significant issue for natural law.
I'm sure I haven't stated the issue very well, but maybe someone can address that too.
PSB's response:
Here is my conclusion; you can follow my thinking below.
I think that you are right about a critical distinction between Nominalism and Scholasticism being whether God is just "another object in the world" versus being the ground of existence itself. Under Thomism, everything that exists, exists in a true relationship with God, i.e., things other than God "participate" in God's goodness and being because they exist because they are ordered to God's own goodness. Since there is such a relationship, things can be compared to God.
Nominalism does not teach that things are ordered to God. The existence of things says nothing about the nature of God. Things cannot be compared to God.
For things to be compared there must be some idea or word that encompasses the things to be compared. We can compare a large ball and a small ball, for example, but we can't compare the taste of an banana with the color blue because there is no idea or word that covers both experiences at the same time. For all practical purposes, the taste of a banana and the color blue might as well be in separate universes.
Repudiating universals would have the tendency of putting God into a "different universe" in terms of making a comparison between Creator and Created. If words just describe individual things, then we don't have the ability to compare Creator and Creation.
Remove the ability to make such a comparison of existence or goodness between Creator and Creature, then all that remains is God as a "boss."
Analysis:
Obviously, one of us is going to have to break down and read William of Ockham or Duns Scotus.
Until we do, though, here are some sketchy points that are not tightly reasoned.
According David Allen Gillespie, The Theological Origins of Modernity:
"Faith alone, Ockham argues, teaches us that God is omnipotent and that he can do anything that is possible, that is to say, everything that is not contradictory. thus, ever being exists only as a result of his willing it and it exists as it does and as long as it does only because he so wills it. Creation is thus an act of sheer grace and is comprehensible only through revelation. God creates the world and continues to act within it, bound neither by his own laws nor by his previous determinations. He acts simply and solely as he pleases and, and as Ockham often repeats, he is no man's debtor. There is thus no immutable order of nature or reason that man can understand and no knowledge of God except through revelation."
In the Thomistic scheme, God is pure being itself. “Pure being” implies a particular kind of thing, namely that God is “pure act” – or “total actualization” - which means that there is no “potentiality” in God. God does not have the potential to be anything other than what He is. He is, therefore, immutable.
ST I, 9, 1.
First, because it was shown above that there is some first being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act, without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason that, absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable.
God’s immutability – His perfect actualization without the possibility of potentiality, or ability to change by getting better or worse – follows from His perfection
ST I, 4 , 1:
Reply to Objection 3. Existence is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual; for nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence is that which actuates all things, even their forms.
It seems that this idea of pure existence meaning “pure act” ties into the immutability of God’s will.
ST I, 19, 7.
Now it has already been shown that both the substance of God and His knowledge are entirely unchangeable (9, 1; 14, 15). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable.
One of the conclusions that Thomas reached was that God necessarily wills His own good:
Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end.
Now, that conclusion is clearly different than that which is ascribed to Ockham, who argued that God was not constrained by nothing – not even His own past determinations.
There is also a “jump” from God to the created world through God’s will.
God wills things other than Himself but those things are willed as part of God’s willing His own goodness.
ST I, 19, 2:
I answer that, God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above (Article 1). For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things should be partakers therein.
Hmmmm….also, it is the nature of God’s willing, rather than his mere existence, that allows creation to participate in God’s existence. Id.
Reply to Objection 1. The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has already been said (13, 4). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from Himself.
So, let’s stop here for a moment. In Scholasticism, created things exist separately from God because they are ordered to God’s goodness in that God creates things as part of His willing His own good. In Nominalism, God has no such necessary purpose in willing things – He just does it.
This means that in Nominalism there is no real relationship between God’s “existence” and the objects of His will, as there is Scholasticism.
The idea of a relationship is essential to our belief that we can understand God by looking at His creation.
Being is convertible to Goodness (
ST I, 5, 1) - because (a) for a thing to be good it must necessarily exist and (b) we know - pace Augustine - that evil is merely the absence of Good, evil having no ontological existence itself. We humans have a natural experience of goodness and being - which is merely a pale penumbra from God. Still, our natural experience of goodness and being is nonetheless a true experience of God.
This conclusion follows from the fact that all things desire their own perfection, which means that ultimately they desire God.
ST I, 6, 1:
Reply to Objection 2. All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine being; as appears from what is said above (Question 4, Article 3). And so of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; others know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a natural desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence.
All goodness participates in God's goodness, i.e., things are good to the extent that they resemble, more or less, God. However, if things "participate" in God's goodness or being, they "resemble" in some way God, and, therefore, we can discern something of God in examining created things.