Book Review ...
...The Story of a Great Medieval Book: Peter Lombard's 'Sentences' (Rethinking the Middle Ages) by Philipp W. Rosemann
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This is a wonderful book of history. The author Philipp W. Rosemann offers a fascinating examination of Peter Lombard's Book of Sentences and its treatment over four centuries. Rosemann provides a look at a rare slice of medieval life, specifically the role that the Book of Sentences played in the developing universities. Finally, he shares an insight into a feature of human thought, namely its tendency to unfold a text into insights, theories and speculations until it fractures, at which point there is a refolding of the diverse skeins of insights, theories and speculation back into the original text.
Rosemann organizes his book in a century by century form, devoting a chapter to each of the Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, with the final chapter on the "Long Fifteenth Century" culminating in Martin Luther's involvement with the Book of Sentences.
The Book of Sentences was written by Peter Lombard, aka "The Master of Sentences" or "The Lombard," in the mid-12th Century as a "study aid" for his students. In the 12th Century, education was moving from the monasteries to the universities. Paris hosted a number of private theology teachers such as Peter Lombard. The Master based his book on the lectures he had been giving to his students for the previous thirty years. The book organized the opinions of religious authorities, such as Augustine and Gregory, on various subjects in a format that covered topics ranging from the Trinity to the sacraments. As the centuries went by this organizational format would persist as the way that systematic theology was structured during the ensuing centuries, even after theologians stopped interacting with the Lombard's actual text.
Lombard's book was an instant hit. Lombard became Bishop of Paris in 1159. In 1215, the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 consecrated the Sentences as supremely orthodox by approving Lombard's understanding of the Trinity. (p. 61.)
The Sentences were used by teachers of theology throughout Catholic Europe. Some universities had regulations requiring that the Sentences be taught. After Lombard, every theologian of note, including Aquinas, Ockham, Scotus and Luther, wrote a commentary on the Sentences.
Although it was a study aid, the early history of the Sentences involved developing study aids to assist in the use of the study aid. This resulted in the production of glosses and abbreviations. The glosses were the lecture notes that were added to the sides of the student's texts. Eventually, these glosses became books in their own right, although they required the text of the Sentences in order to follow the explanations in the glosses. Interestingly, one can see this format in Aquinas' commentaries on Aristotle and the various books of the Bible. Eventually, the gloss commentaries developed into stand-alone texts, beginning the tradition of writing commentaries.
Abbreviations were summaries of the texts. One interesting point made by Roseman is that at the time of the earliest abbreviations, in the 13th Century, the alphabetical order was still new, which resulted in a certain incompetence in creating alphabetical indexes. (p. 89.) Previously, and continuing throughout the 13th Century, the practice had been to arrange references in a "logical or indeed cosmological order," such as starting with God and working down through creation, as the Master had done in his book. (p. 89.) Rosemann makes the priceless observation that the move from the "cosmological" to the alphabetical order constituted a Copernican turn whereby men moved from being readers of signs, whose principle task was to understand the cosmos, to writers of signifiers, whose task was to impose an order on the universe. (p. 90.) Rosemann doesn't explore the issue, but one has to wonder how much of that "Copernican turn" eventually resulted in Nominalism and modernity. It's a topic worth contemplating.
Rosemann does a brilliant job of explaining the "crisis" provoked by the condemnation of various scholastic teachings by Bishop Etienne Tempier, the Bishop of Paris, in 1277. Tempier's condemnation was based less on the fact that anyone was actually teaching heresy, but on his concern that such a heresy might develop. The errors condemned in 1277 seem to be those teachings that sought to put philosophy on a higher plane than theology. The condemnation led directly to Nominalism, according to Rosemann, in that one of the earliest figures in the development of Nominalism - Duns Scotus - was deeply influenced by Henry of Ghent, who had been one of the members of the commission that drew up the list of errors that were condemned in 1277 by the Bishop of Paris. (p. 103.)
Rosemann's follows the development of Nominalism into its ever more abstract mode of thought. Nominalism was inspired by an effort to carve out an area of autonomy for theology by distinguishing between God's inscrutable absolute power - potentia absoluta - and God's power as exercised in a covenantal relationship with creation - potentia ordinate. (p. 137.) In contradistinction to Thomism, Nominalism taught that because all of creation was absolutely contingent on God's exercise of his absolute freedom, there was no "metaphysical structure" that could be traced back to the Creator and thus the created order was "best analyzed at the level of the existing individual." ( p. 138.) Over time, it appears that once God's freedom had been secured, theologians felt "authorized to unleash the tools of liberal arts without restraint." (p. 187.)
A theme that runs through Rosemann's book is the movement from "signs" to signifiers." Rosemann writes, "If there obtains no necessary, metaphysical connection between the Creator and the creation - if the connection is historical, covenantal, and hence contingent - then creation needs to be analyzed in itself, without recourse to a foundation in the meta-realities such as God or universal, abstract natures that sustain it. For this reasons the nominalist project is no longer aimed at understanding the cosmos through the analysis of signs, but rather at understanding the signifiers that we employ in speaking about the world." (p. 188.)
Another theme of Rosemann's book is that the move from signs to signifiers as the basis for thinking about the world was accompanied by a decoupling of theology from piety. As theology moved from sacra pagina - the study of scripture - to scienta divina - the divine science - theology became less and less concerned with lived spirituality, such as moral theology (p. 47; Cf. Servais Pinckaer, Morality: The Catholic View), scripture (p. 76), spirituality (p. 108), and salvation and the nourishing of faith. (p. 128.) By the "long Fifteenth Century," the project of theology was looking for a return to its roots as some theologicans, including the "Ecstatic Doctor" - Denys the Carthusian - sought to restore a concern for the nourishing of faith to theology. Eventually, the separation of theology from spirituality had reached the point where Martin Luther could condemn "Aristotle, the stinking philosopher" (p. 182) and, eventually, after Rosemann's book closes, advocate a wholesale return to sources in a return to the Bible alone.
Rosemann's book is an excellent read. He manages to move the story along by a narrow focus on the Book of Sentences, and, yet, offer a panoramic view of the major shifts in thought and ideology that were associated with the treatment of the Sentences. Rosemann also provides a nice glossary of the scholastic terms of art used in the book.
Wednesday, January 25, 2012
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4 comments:
Presumably Rosemann knows that Aquinas also uses the potentia ordinata/absoluta distinction.
And what exactly is the link between Scotus and nominalism? Becuase the nominalists argue against scotus? They also argue directly against Henry. Henry was prominent all on his own without any help from Scotus. That's why Scotus picked henry rather than Aquinas to be the object of much of his criticism: in the 1290's, he was more important than Aquinas.
Lee: "Presumably Rosemann knows that Aquinas also uses the potentia ordinata/absoluta distinction."
PSB: Seems like he should know that.
Of course, the nominalists and the Thomists used the distinction for completely different ends.
Lee: "And what exactly is the link between Scotus and nominalism?"
PSB: On p. 101, Rosemann writes:
"As Scotus explains, "it is possible for god, on account of his absolute power (de potentia absoluta), to save anyone whatsoever," even a non-Christian who completely lacks the faith. However, "on account of his ordered power (de potentia ordinata), [grace] is not given without a preceding habit of faith."
Later, in the next paragraph, Rosemann writes:
"The distinction between potentia ordinata and potentia absoluta constitutes the root of late medieveal "nominalism" - a doctrine usually understood, reductively, as the denial of the existence of universals outside the mind....Although Scotus was not a nominalist in this sense, he paved the way for it, precisely through the prominent place the distinction between God's absolute and ordered powers occupy in his thought. For this distinction severs any necesary causal link between the Creator and creation: since God could have creted a different world, the structures of creation cannot be traced back metaphysically to the Creator. Creation, consequently, needs to be understood on its own terms, for what it is in itself. From this conviction, it is only one further step to the denial of universals as a kind of meta-reality that exists in addition to the world of individual things." (Id. at p. 101 - 102.)
Lee: "Becuase the nominalists argue against scotus? "
PSB: Did they? Would you care to elaborate.
Lee: They also argue directly against Henry. Henry was prominent all on his own without any help from Scotus. That's why Scotus picked henry rather than Aquinas to be the object of much of his criticism: in the 1290's, he was more important than Aquinas.
PSB: It probably didn't hurt that Henry was on the commission that condemned some of Aquinas' conclusions as "unorthodox."
Since you are probably better versed on this, a question on Aquinas' influence in the period immediately after his death. It is said that Aquinas was not as influential as other, now essentially unknown theologians, in, at least the 13th Century. Rosemann notes that Alexander of Hales was considered the "go to" guy among 13th Century theologicans, overshadowing Aquinas, Bonaventure and Albert. Also, Aquinas' project of supplanting the Sentences with the Summa never caught on.
And yet Thomas was canonized 50 years after his death, and in the Paradisio (circa 1321), Dante mentions Aquinas, but not, so far as I know, Scotus. So, it doesn't seem that Aquinas was all that insignificant.
What's your view on this?
A few points.
1. Aquinas was influential, but mainly in his own order. Around 1282 the Dominicans made adherence to Thomism mandatory and persecuted non adherents such as Durandus a sancto porciano. Outside the order, Henry was more influential, partly because the franciscans forbade the reading of Aquinas to all but the most advanced students and even then only with william de la mare's corrections. Dante was educated by the Dominicans in some sense at Florence, so it is not surprising he would give prominence to Aquinas. Early scotism took root mainly in Spain and France.
I don't quite see the connection between the 1277 condemnations and the rise of nominalism. Henry was indeed on the commission, but he is rather ambiguous with respect to thomism. He originally held Aquinas' view of the unicity of substantial form, but was ordered to change it to the pluralist position by the bishop and did. Aquinas is not singled out by name in the condemnation, and no one has ever agreed on how many propositions can actually be linked to Aquinas. When Aquinas was canonized, 6 props. had their censure lifted, but i have never seen this document.
2. The nominalists do indeed argue against Scotus. Gerson hated the Scotists, and wanted to return theology to the study of Aquinas and Bonaventure. And if you have ever looked at Ockham and Scotus' works, you will understand the following analogy:
Henry:Scotus::Scotus:Ockham.
Scotus is Ockham's favorite whipping boy.
3. The Rosemann quote is balderdash. For one thing, nominalism does actually primarily refer to the position on universals (Scotus is a realist) and there is no connection between the potentia absoluta/ordinata distinction and a position on the status of universals.
And in any case, while Scotus does indeed use the distinction, he did not originate it, nor, contrary to Rosemann does it play much role in his thought. Rosemanns follow-up comment on it is just plain false. Every christian thinker is going to have to say that creation is contingent. The contingency of creation, better, the fact of creation is reducible to the divine will. But the "structures" of creation for Scotus are generated by the divine intellect prior to any decision on the part of the will. So the structures are linked metaphysically to God. Of course "necessary causal link" is vague. The link is the divine will, actualizing according to the divine ideas. There is a relation of dependence on the creator, both for actual existence as well as for the structure of the created essence.
But I don't see why this is either-or. Creation also needs to be understood on its own terms, apart from God: that's why we have the sciences: physics, metaphysics, geometry, and so on. I"ll never understand why the postmodernists always fail to realize this (Rosemann is a postmodernist; jus read his 'reading scholastic thought with Foucault', where he accuses the scholastics of being responsible for fetishizing reason and causing people hundreds of years later to hate the non rational 'other').
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