Friday, May 07, 2010

Book Review - Pedophiles and Priests by Philip Jenkins.

Excellent social history - as informative in 2010 as it was in 1996.

Philip Jenkins "Pedophiles and Priests" is the classic resource for anyone interested in obtaining an even-handed review of the contemporary clerical abuse scandal involving the Catholic Church in America. Jenkins has often been only sober voice in media discussions on the so-called pedophile priest scandal, such as when he points out that the rate of sexual misconduct is no higher for Catholic priests than it is for other clergy and occupations.


Jenkins is a historian, and in many ways, his book is a historical retrospective of the causes and players in the creation of the public perception that there is a unique problem with "pedophile priests." Jenkins' book was that it was published in 1996, so that it traces the history of the scandal from the early 80s through to around 1993. Of course, we know that after 2000 - and particularly when the Boston Globe began reporting on the scandal in the Boston diocese in the early 2000s - the scandal really took off in the public mind. The surprising things about Jenkins' books are (a) how much was going on before the 2000 and (b) how the memes and tropes established in the 80s and 90s continued to play themselves out after 2000.

Jenkins develops his book around the idea that the "priest pedophile" scandal is a matter of "social construction." As he points out, it is one thing to have objective facts, another to construct those objective facts into a public perception that the objective facts hang together in a particular way that has particular meaning worthy of attention. The way that such a "social construction" is created is by "framing" the objective facts in a particular way that attracts attention, fits the presumptions of the public and invests the objective facts with meaning.

Since it is objective facts that are being framed, the question is "who did the framing"? In answer to that question, Jenkins looks at the players who were able to frame individual scandals involving Catholic priests, invariably homosexual, and boys in their mid to late teens, in order to frame the image of the "pedophile priest" as somehow being the norm of Catholic priests. The players included victim groups, lawyers, dissident Catholics, therapists and the news media.

Jenkins does a fantastic job of explaining how these players managed to frame a "pedophile priest" scandal as a matter of established fact in the public mind, notwithstanding the fact that the individual cases did not usually involve pedophilia - which is an attraction to prepubescent child - but homosexual ephobophilia - which is an attraction to post-pubescent males - and did not involve more than around 2% of all priests (approximately .03% being pedophiled and 1.7% being ephobophiles) based on a review of records of the Diocese of Chicago (and largely confirmed in subsequent studies.)

Jenkins does a great job of explaining how this scandal emerged in large part because of changing value systems, including a change in the perception of the seriousness of sexual misconduct with minors. For those reading this in 2010, the Roman Polanski case offers an interesting proof to Jenkins' argument about changing attitudes. Namely, in 1977, Polanski was sentenced by a prosecutor to no time in jail and a 90 day psychiatric assessment for sodomizing a 13 year old girl. By standards of 2010, that now seems to show incredible insensitivity on the part of the prosecutor, but as Jenkins notes, by the therapeutic standards of the `60s and `70s, the psychiatric approach was normal, and it is potentially misleading to judge the motivations behind decisions made 30 years ago by standards held by people living today. That, however, is something endemic in Catholic priest scandal cases, where the bulk of such cases involve decisions in the `90s and `00s for decisions made in the `60s and `70s.

Another sea change in American life was the fact that in the `70s and `80s, the media stopped showing religion in general and the Catholic Church in particular the deference it had traditionally shown. Thus, scandals that would not have seen the light of day in 1965 were front page news in 1995. Undoubtedly, the Catholic Church and its members have had their welfare improved by this development, albeit the constant focus of news stories on the Catholic Church exclusively makes media coverage something of a wash.

Jenkins is quite good when he points out that the Catholic Church became a particular target for lawsuits because of its centralization - thereby offering "deep pockets" to pay judgments - and its bureaucratization, which included maintaining records that lawyers could obtain in discovery for the purpose of securing new defendants and plaintiffs. So, while there has been a tendency to make the Catholic Church's problem a matter of its theology or practice, the fact is that the Catholic Church is simply a much more attractive target for lawyers for the same reason that bank robbers rob banks - because that is where the money is. Also, as a practicing plaintiff's trial attorney, I have to hand it to Jenkins for being the first person I have read to make the connection between the rise of liability insurance and the development of novel legal theories of liability. The layman probably isn't aware of the fact that law often develops in one area because lawyers are attracted to that area because the possibility of obtaining a recovery is guaranteed by an insurance policy.

Jenkins is also quite good in his observation that Catholic internal politics played a key role in making the scandal a particularly Catholic scandal. He points out that the scandal arose at a time when the American Catholic Church was transforming itself from a "sect" into a "religion." As a sect, Catholicism had high internal cohesion and high conflict with society. After Vatican II, it appeared that American Catholicism was becoming a "religion, with low internal cohesion and low conflict with society, by essentially transforming itself into something like a mainstream Protestant denomination. However, this process of transformation fell short some time after the election of Pope John Paul II in 1978, resulting in liberal Catholics with an axe to grind against the hierarchy, and against the practice of celibacy for priests, as well as other traditional doctrines and practices, and a Catholic membership that would not circle the wagons the same way that they would have back when they belonged to a "sect." This then permitted Catholic voices - such as the liberal National Catholic Register - to engage in internal Catholic polemics that were then picked up by the mainstream media that otherwise might have been accused of anti-Catholicism but for the fact that it was parroting things said by Catholics. The conservative Catholics likewise played into the "framing" of the "pedophile priest" scandal because of their agenda in undermining what they perceived to be non-orthodox homosexual activist priests.

I heartily recommend Jenkins' book as a primary source for anyone who wants an objective, outsider's perspective on how the subject. Although it was written in 1996, the analysis seems to remain pertinent to the situation of the Catholic Church after 15 years.

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