unbillable hours has an link to Harriet McBryde Johnson's account of her interactions with Peter Singer. Singer is the Princeton Philosopher whose utilitarianism has led him to argue that human children are no more significant in a moral sense than grown animals and that parents should have a legal to infanticide with respect to disabled children.
Johnson, on the other hand, is afflicted with a condition that has left her wheelchair bound, able to eat only pureed food, and unable to move herself when her body's center of gravity shifts. Notwithstanding all that - a phrase that Johnson would condemn as sheerest bigotry - Johnson is a practicing attorney and offended by the idea that her life has not been worth living and should have been terminated when she was an infant.
Not surprisingly, I am on Johnson's side in her argument with Singer. Nonetheless, I was amazed at the theoretical weakness of her position. It was almost as if she was trying to outflank Singer with utilitarian arguments, while basing her case on two specific rhetorical fallacies - the ad hominem attack and special pleading.
The ad hominem aspect of Johnson's thinking seemed almost to create a fugue state in her. The syllogism of Johnson's argument appears to be something like: (a) only a monster would argue in favor of killing children like Johnson, (b) Singer makes such an argument, (c) Singer is a monster, (d) arguments by moral monsters are per se immoral and wrong. The problem is that Singer isn't a monster; he's a philosopher. Consequently, Johnson has to struggle in her dealings with a person who is in fact quite humane. For example, Johnson stresses over minutia like being polite to Singer, shaking his hand, allowing him to assist her when she needs assistance. That sets up this passage:
It is generally assumed that I handled the substantive discussion well, but people worry that my civility may have given Singer a new kind of legitimacy. I hear from Laura, a beloved movement sister. She is appalled that I let Singer provide even minor physical assistance at the dinner. ''Where was your assistant?'' she wants to know. How could I put myself in a relationship with Singer that made him appear so human, even kind?
I struggle to explain. I didn't feel disempowered; quite the contrary, it seemed a good thing to make him do some useful work. And then, the hard part: I've come to believe that Singer actually is human, even kind in his way. There ensues a discussion of good and evil and personal assistance and power and philosophy and tactics for which I'm profoundly grateful.
Is this really what concerns people in a "movement?" Being polite to the "enemy?" I would bet that this kind of thinking explains much of what one sees in "movement" rhetoric. The "movement" really believes that their opponents are less than human and deserving of no respect on any level because of their views. Amazing, I have never seen a better instance of "objectifying the other."
Obviously, Singer is a nice man. Why wouldn't he be. It's not his manners that are the problem; it's his philosophy. The argument is philosophical, and unless you can effectively model Mother Teresa, you had better not stake your victory on the idea that everyone will agree that your enemy is a monster.
The other prong of Johnson's argument is simply "special pleading." She offers herself as exhibit one in her case. She explains that she felt life was worth living, that she preferrs existence to non-existence, that she resents being told that she was a burden or that her family would have been better off if she had been neatly disposed of when she was one month old.
But, really, so what? Obviously, she would feel that way. But is her special perspective compelling for others? How can she say that her "utility" - her enjoyment - is really positive? What is she comparing it to? What about the negative utility that she brought to others? How about the person who was deprived of a seat in law school who might have gone on to provide greater social utility as a divorce attorney than someone who squandered her education by becoming a "disability advocate?"
One can certainly learn a lot from a clearly courageous woman like Johnson who has overcome a lot. Johnson's experience says a lot about the power of the human spirit and the meaning of life, but oddly Johnson doesn't seem to say it. Her big contribution to to the debate is the idea that society oppresses the disabled, and that that wrongness of oppression vindicates her position. Thus, when dealing with the issue of allowing the disabled to choose the option of suicide, Johnson concludes:
I side with Gill. What worries me most about the proposals for legalized assisted suicide is their veneer of beneficence -- the medical determination that, for a given individual, suicide is reasonable or right. It is not about autonomy but about nondisabled people telling us what's good for us.
In the discussion that follows, I argue that choice is illusory in a context of pervasive inequality. Choices are structured by oppression. We shouldn't offer assistance with suicide until we all have the assistance we need to get out of bed in the morning and live a good life. Common causes of suicidality -- dependence, institutional confinement, being a burden -- are entirely curable.
Later, when a philosophy professor points out that her arguments are tactical and asks her what she would say "if we assume that such conditions do not exist?" Her response was a non-comprehending "why would we want to do that?" Johnson then feels "as if she is losing caste." What she never gets is that the problem is that others in society, the majority let's say, might assume at any time that the existential structures of oppression don't exist, and if that's the case what's her fall back argument for why suicide is wrong? What if society decides that oppression exists, but that's ok? Why, incidentally, is suicide wrong if it results from oppression? Because then suicide isn't a free choice? Ah, so it's choice that determines if something is good or not. Then, we'll set up structures and programs to ensure freedom of choice. Does suicide then become acceptable. I don't know about you, but if I were a disability advocate, I would want a stronger ontological fire-break against pragmatic utilitarians.
Singer is an atheist utilitarian. So, apparently, is Johnson, and she is offended by Singer's argument that opposition to his views are "religious."
Singer seems curious to learn how someone who is as good an atheist as he is could disagree with his entirely reasonable views. At the same time, I am trying to plumb his theories. What has him so convinced it would be best to allow parents to kill babies with severe disabilities, and not other kinds of babies, if no infant is a ''person'' with a right to life? I learn it is partly that both biological and adoptive parents prefer healthy babies. But I have trouble with basing life-and-death decisions on market considerations when the market is structured by prejudice. I offer a hypothetical comparison: ''What about mixed-race babies, especially when the combination is entirely nonwhite, who I believe are just about as unadoptable as babies with disabilities?'' Wouldn't a law allowing the killing of these undervalued babies validate race prejudice? Singer agrees there is a problem. ''It would be horrible,'' he says, ''to see mixed-race babies being killed because they can't be adopted, whereas white ones could be.'' What's the difference? Preferences based on race are unreasonable. Preferences based on ability are not. Why? To Singer, it's pretty simple: disability makes a person ''worse off.''
Are we ''worse off''? I don't think so. Not in any meaningful sense. There are too many variables. For those of us with congenital conditions, disability shapes all we are. Those disabled later in life adapt. We take constraints that no one would choose and build rich and satisfying lives within them. We enjoy pleasures other people enjoy, and pleasures peculiarly our own. We have something the world needs.
Except that her dislike of the market notwithstanding, who says the disabled have something the "world needs." The market? Utilitarian philosophers? Popular vote?
What is the value of a human being? Why are the disabled entitled to life? To read Johnson's narrative it appears that she and Singer agree on the answer - the value of a human life is in the quality of life. She and Singer simply disagree about whether the disabled have a quality of life that makes their lives worth living. Well, if that's the issue, lets get someone to decide. Appoint a special commission, or take a vote, or have a big debate between Singer and Johnson, and let's decide.
Unless, of course, you believe that mere humans don't get to make that decision about other humans or that human lives have a unique value because they are human lives.
I think Johnson's problem is identified by Alasdair MacIntyre in After Virtue. McIntyre's notion is that without a consistent tradition in which to analyze moral question, debates over moral questions are nothing more than incoherent, ad hoc rationalizations. Johnson's arguments seem to bear out this insight. Because she is a utilitarian, when she is confronted with a real utilitarian, she has nothing to argue except over who is a nicer pperson.






















