The Law Knows No Heresy - the Legal Ramifications of Picking Sides in a Religious Controversy
As an attorney who has tried a case involving the issues of church government, religious doctrine, and the First Amendment doctrine, I was frankly astounded when I read this
Washington Post article on the D.C. judge who refused to sentence homosexual activists for trespass. [I had intended to discuss this issue previously, but the Columbia tragedy intervened.] My astonishment has substantially less to do with my religion, than it has to do with my legal experience.
The Facts
To recap, according to
the Washington Post three Catholic gay activists were convicted of unlawful entry by a "sympathetic judge," Judge Mildred M. Edwards, who told them that she would do something she had not done in 15 years - she would dispense with sentencing. Judge Edwards is reported as telling the convicted trespassers:
"Tremendous violence was done to you . . . when the Body of Christ was denied to you," Edwards said, referring to the contention of the three that refusal of Holy Communion had prompted their actions. "As a member of your church, I ask you to forgive the church."
The background to the conviction appears to have been that at a Mass held during the annual Conference of Catholic Bishops, the three protestors were misidentified as members of a "Rainbow Sash" movement, which had announced that its members would receive communion as a "protest." A priest decided that individuals should not receive the sacrament as a protest and had determined that members of "Rainbow Sash" would be excluded from Communion. The three protestors were in fact not "Rainbow Sash" members; they were part of the "gay activist group, Soulforce" who, according to the prosecutor, had traveled to the Bishop's conference to demand an explanation for why the had been refused Communion the day before.
Although the Soulforce activists claimed that they merely sought to "find healing among the people" who caused them to suffer, it is reasonable to conclude from their behavior that they were knowingly engaging in street theater in order to protest Church policy concerning homosexuality. According to the Washington Post:
The prosecutors said the reason for the activists' refusal to leave was irrelevant; they broke the law when, after repeated requests by police and hotel officials to move, they remained in the lobby of a private building, hands outstretched, waiting for someone to give them Communion.
The judge agreed, saying they were in a private area, had no right to be there and were given sufficient warning to leave.
Nonetheless, the judge opined that her Church was wrong and that the protestors should "go in peace," which is, of course, the parting benediction that a priest offers to his congregants in a religious ceremony.
Perspectives
Andrew Sullivan’s position is unclear. Although he seems to recognize the right of the Church to establish its own doctrine's, he doesn't seem to find Judge Edward's comments to troubling. He observes:
What the judge said merely amounted to bearing witness to what many perceive to be injustice. You may disagree and support the exclusion of openly gay Catholics from the sacraments, but it's an over-reach to describe this conscientious objection as a form of bigotry
Sullivan's comments were written in response to
Rod Dreher's charges that Judge Edward's comments were examples of bigotry.
Sed Contra, in an intelligent post, made the theologically important point that the "Rainbow Sash" folks were not disbarred from communion because of their political goal, but because of their state of grace relative to the Sacrament. He concluded his post with this thought:
Finally, as to the judge herself. It's a free country with an independent judiciary. She is free to say what she wants from the bench, no matter how misguided it may be. But I am also not sure I would have imposed any sentence either. After all, its not like they desecrated the Eucharist as folks did a while back at St. Patrick's in New York or, more recently, had sex there during Mass.
My objection is to the easy way in which Judge Edward's sentencing pronouncement has been treated as a matter of "free speech." My point in this post is to explain that the prosecutors were right - the protesters' motivation was not relevant to the sentencing decision. Further, as I will explain, under established principles of constitutional jurisprudence, Judge Edwards was "not free" to say what she wanted from the bench insofar as she involved herself in matters of religious doctrine.
A quick outline of the interraction between the First Amendment and Religious Polity
My involvement in this area has involved controversies over the ownership and control of religious property. These issues can arise when a local church breaks away from the denomination. If the church is a congregational church, such as the Baptists, ownership issues are fairly straightforward; the local church keeps the property. If the Church is hierarchical, as with the Catholic church, local secession is unthinkable.
The problem arises with the churches that are neither fish nor fowl. The Methodists and Presbyterians, for example, have elements of a both congregational and a hierarchical polity. [In addition, the Methodist church tries to deny its jural existence in the Book of Discipline.] These churches typically attempt to assert control over the local church's real property through trust provisions in their organizational documents of the denomination, the real property deeds or the local church's corporate documents.
For a long period of time, constitutional law recognized an “implied trust” theory. In Watson v. Jones (1872) 80 U.S. 679, the court held that when a religious congregation or ecclesiastical body holding church property is a subordinate body of an organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals possessing general and ultimate power of control over church matters, the decisions of such tribunals control church property disputes to the exclusion of the civil courts. The hierarchical theory asserts that when a subordinate congregation of a hierarchical church secedes from the church, it had no right to retain church property held in its own name. The implied trust theory was repudiated in Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church (1969) 393 U.S. 440, where the court there ruled that under the First Amendment a civil court is not allowed to adjudicate church property disputes by interpreting religious doctrine and practice and then relying on its own interpretation of doctrine to allocate control over church property. The opinion did not attempt to prescribe specific alternative methods a court must use to resolve church property disputes, but it noted that "neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, ... can be applied without 'establishing' churches to which property is awarded." The Hull Court developed the neutral principles rule so as to disallow the “departure from doctrine” rule which had previously obtained. Prior to the Hull decision, while courts would imply a trust in hierarchical churches, they would also vitiate the trust where the denomination had “departed from doctrine.” [This rule seems to comport with reasonable expectations; church members who made their donations to the church expected their churches to remain true to doctrine.]
Here is a passage from
Hull, quoting the Jones decision, which is pertinent and quotable:
In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect. . . . All who unite themselves to such a body [the general church] do so with an implied consent to [its] government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them [sic] reversed. It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for."
Under the First Amendment, courts simply cannot be in the business of determining if a given doctrine - denying protesting homosexuals communion, for example - is heresy.
There is one area, though, where the rule of deference is automatic and absolute - schisms. If a hierarchy or denomination decides that a subordinate component of the church is in schism, the question is settled, which can have dramatic consequences on polity and property issues.
Personal experience
I was involved in a trial last year over a local Methodist church’s withdrawal from the Methodist denomination. The reason for the departure was that along with using church money for practices that the local church found obnoxious - e.g., handing out contraceptives to their children on church retreats - the local Bishop refused to answer direct questions about whether, inter alia, he believed in the Resurrection of Christ. The local church’s refusal to accept a pastoral change triggered a dispute over the property that the local church membership had painstakingly purchased over the years and which they have dedicated to performing good works in a needy area of Fresno.
We absolutely could not get into evidence any issue pertaining to the Methodist denominations putative departure from doctrine. Any reference to such issues brought the Court proceedings to an abrupt halt. A short-hand developed to refer to this subject as the “dispute.” As far as a reviewing court will be concerned, the cause of the dispute could arisen from anything ranging from inconsequential personality disputes to the hierarchy's involvement in simony or pederast orgies. Where issues of church governance are concerned, the law just doesn't care. [Don't be tempted to overstate this point for rhetorical advantage. Church leaders can be held criminally and civilly liable for their intentional or negligent malfeasance, but where church governance per se is concerned - determining who is a member, determining what doctrines are taught, determining who gets what sacrament - the law is constitutionally blind.]
Analysis
If you have followed the discussion through the applicable case law, it should be fairly obvious how Judge Edward’s comments are constitutionally offensive. First, by expressing an apology for the Church, she did recognize heresy. Through her “witness” - which was not her personal opinion - she announced that the State found the Catholic hierarchy’s position to be wrong - she apologized to the protesters for their treatment on behalf of the body of Christ. In short, she determined that certain actions were not Christian. This definition of "heresy" would have been recognized by St. Augustine in his dealings with the Donatists.
Second, Judge Edwards' announcement violated clear law. Like it or not, the First Amendment recognizes the prerogative of the denomination to determine who are the schismatics or heretics. No one is required to be Catholic, but if you want to be Catholic, you voluntarily agree to let them make such decisions. That incidentally is not Catholic dogma; it is a
statement of law.
A final serious concern is that the defense of Judge Edward’s legal decision speaks volumes about the dangers of the absence of a coherent political theory. The term "civil rights" is now commonly viewed as meaning only those privileges that an individual has
against the state. [See
this post.] Warren court triumphalism has largely accentuated this view of "civil rights." Thus, civil rights are conventionally understood to include personal rights such as the right to an attorney, the right against arbitrary arrest, the right to due process of law before the deprivation of life, liberty or property or freedom of speech.
Civil rights, however, include something more than a zone of personal autonomy against the state. Implicit within Anglo-American jurisprudence was the idea that the government has an affirmative obligation to protect its citizenry's life, property and liberty. See, for example,
Locke's Second Treatise on Government which posited the philosophical idea of the “social contract” under which the state provides protective services to its citizens in return for those citizen's surrender their primeval right of self defense. Likewise, Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia developed Locke's social contract concept into a defense of limited government - the minimalist state. Perhaps the same zeitgeist that led to the academic view that Nozick's ideas were
philosophically repugnant, also caused an amnesia as to the substantial philosophical tradition that a person’s
civil rights included the protection of his life, liberty and property.
The protection of life, liberty and property is a civil right. It is in fact the first civil right. Jews in Nazi Germany and residents of New York City during the 1970s could certainly attest to the idea that without personal security other rights are meaningless.
Announcing to the world that Catholic sacraments are fair game for protest, which is what Judge Edwards did, has the effect of letting the world know that it is open season for such conduct in the District of Columbia.
This is truly serious stuff.
Feedback
unbillable hours reports in from New Jersey with the temperate observation that while Judge Edward's sentencing decision may be supportable, her sentencing pronouncement seems troubling. I agree. I think a judicial officer has to have some discretion with respect to sentencing, and if the trespass was de minimis, then a "no-sentence" sentence might have been proper. Nonetheless, her gratuitous sentencing pronouncement shows that Judge Edwards doesn't understand her constitutional obligations. The proper remedy is probably a review of her fitness by a judicial review commission. [We here in the Valley have had our experience with judicial eccentrics.
Tulare County Judge Howard Broadman never got out of hot water for his "creative sentencing" of a mother of four to implantation of Norplant as a condition of parole. Although he had decent local support, he was under review until he finally took early retirement.]
The OmbudsGod picked up on the question of "who determines dogma?" Which, if you think about, is more core to the First Amendment than whether a creche is allowed to be placed in a public square.
The Blog from the Core asks the question of what the reaction of the ACLU would have been if a non-Christian religion had been involved. Interesting implications flow from such a thought experiment. Assume that a Moslem judge had publicly announced that he would not sentence Sunni protestors who had trespassed during a Shiite ceremony because the Shiites were wrong in their religious beliefs. This would be such a clear violation of the First Amendment that the Judge would be censured before the sun set. I can't see the difference between this hypothetical and Judge Edwards conduct.
Patty at
Pdawwg notes that the Church-State issue is more than a parochial concern to Catholics, which seems exactly right if the hypothetical example outlined above has any traction.
Finally, you people over at www.neopoeia.com need to tell me what the heck you're talking about. I know I have been getting hits from you, but I can't link through to your site because of some restrictive registration requirement.